Where should we start when it comes to peacebuilding? Should we focus on the most promising solution that delivers a quick yet potentially short-lived solution, or instead, the most difficult solution that takes longer but may deliver a more lasting peace? A simple, four-stage recipe for peace might include building support, establishing credibility, accepting compromise, and finally, peace. Many assume that peace might be achieved with such a formula, but people are complex, and issues run deep. Nobel Peace Laureate Jody Williams once said, “Peace is hard work. It’s not just about holding hands and singing Kumbaya.”
Dave Steward, who worked closely with former South African President FW de Klerk, was a witness to the delicate and historic negotiations for peace in South Africa before that country’s first democratic elections in 1994. He served as Head of the South African Communication Service from 1985 until 1992, after which he was appointed Chief Government Spokesman within the Office of the President and later that year was appointed Chief of Staff in the Office of President FW de Klerk. He and the former President established the FW de Klerk Foundation in June 1999 and its Centre for Constitutional Rights in 2006.
In the 1990s, Steward stood at the crossroads of a country on the brink of transformation and observed the tense, behind-closed-doors dialogues between Nelson Mandela, the symbol of a new, democratic future, and FW de Klerk, the last president of apartheid-era South Africa.
He gained a rare insight into the complexity of the compromise required to dismantle a system that had oppressed millions for decades, and the peace talks, filled with moments of both confrontation and collaboration, revealed the extraordinary leadership and vision that would soon reshape South Africa’s future. He outlines here the practical steps the South African government took in negotiating a peaceful transition to democracy with Nelson Mandela’s government-in-waiting and the multiple political factions within the country at the time.
Create a Framework Everyone Agrees On
“You need to understand the history, people, and perspectives before you start to unravel a problem,” says Steward. “I was involved in one of the more successful peace processes in recent history.”
The number one rule, according to Steward, is that all parties in the negotiation must accept that there cannot be an armed outcome. “When one party still believes they can achieve their goal through violence and force, they are unlikely to make the compromises that peace requires. Nelson Mandela recognized in the late 1980s that a revolutionary victory was not an option and that continued conflict would leave the country in ruins.”
Take Bold Steps
Mandela opened a line of communication with then-Prime Minister PW Botha without first seeking permission from the leadership of his political party, the African National Conference (ANC), who were still exiled in Lusaka, Zambia. By stepping beyond the conventional boundaries of the time, Mandela prioritized long-term solutions over immediate consensus and recognized that dialogue with the “other side” was a necessary path toward resolution. This boldness can often invite criticism, alienate peers and risk reputation damage, yet it reflected a deep understanding of the stakes and the need to act while others hesitate. Some leaders see potential, whereas others only see a threat, and they understand that real progress often begins with uncomfortable, unpopular conversations.
The South African Defense Force and national security establishment had simultaneously reached the same conclusion — that a viable long-term military solution was not an option. “It was clear the only way forward was negotiation,” says Steward.
Create a Climate of Balance
“You need to avoid asymmetrical power relationships,” says Steward. “When the more powerful party is only prepared to talk if it doesn’t have to make concessions, you have a problem. Both sides need to accept that working toward peace will be painful, and they will need to make concessions on things that are of great importance to both. A degree of confidence in the opposing party is needed, too, something that strangely was always inherent among the citizens of South Africa.”
Steward does acknowledge that the Middle East conflict, where opposing sides harbor an implacable hatred for each other, poses a greater challenge. “One side can’t dictate who it chooses to speak with,” he says. “You need to speak with any party that can influence the outcome. You may call people terrorists and other derogatory names, but if those people can influence an outcome, they need to be at the negotiating table.”
Timing is everything
According to Steward, South Africa could not have achieved in 1980 what it achieved in 1990. “If a National Party leader had said in 1980 that the white minority government should speak with the ANC, he would not have stayed a leader very long. Watch the tide and catch the wave of history when it breaks,” he says.
Plan For Disruption
“Avoid giving extremists on all sides a veto over the continuation of the peace process,” suggests Steward. “In any peace process, you’re going to have radicals on all sides who don’t want a resolution and will do everything they can to sabotage the peace process by instigating violence. Expect this and create contingency plans to deal with it. In South Africa, there were elements of the government security forces that didn’t want peace and actively undermined FW de Klerk. Mandela, too, faced opposition from extremists within the ANC alliance, who tried to disrupt negotiations because they weren’t prepared to make the concessions that negotiations always require.
Build Mechanisms for Emerging Problems
“In 1992, we realized that the increase in violence flaring up around the country was creating enormous distrust among parties involved in the peace negotiating process. Business and faith groups teamed up to launch a national Peace Accord Initiative that included a Peace Secretariat and a code of conduct for all political parties.” Peace Accord organizers established peace committees nationally and throughout the country. The Peace Accord structure also included the Goldstone Commission, which played a crucial role in investigating allegations and incidents of political violence and intimidation.
The commission was chaired by respected judge Justice Richard Goldstone and consisted of five units, staffed by 13 police officers, ten attorneys, and five international observers, who submitted 47 reports to the President over three years. “This allowed any incidence of violence to be referred to an impartial party for investigation and remedial action,” says Steward. “This helped in the relationship between de Klerk and Mandela as it reduced suspicion that either leader was trying to subvert the process through violence.”
The Power of Face-to-Face Meetings
Regular meetings between adversaries were planned to help break down the stereotypes opposing groups had formed of each other. With a sizable number of ANC members still living in exile across Africa and the world, these meetings took on an international agenda. More intimate, individual meetings were held, too. “The head of our Intelligence Agency had more than 100 meetings with Mandela before any formal peace process or negotiation policy was known publicly,” says Steward. “Even the South African cabinet had no idea this dialogue was taking place.”
Stay Cool and Committed
“It’s critical that you don’t let crises derail the process. We had so many crises between 1990 and 1993, and any one of them could have scuppered the entire process,” recalls Steward. In 1992, the negotiations came to a halt after radical elements in the ANC embarked on a process of rolling mass action and strikes aimed at overthrowing the FW de Klerk government – in the same way that the East German government had been overthrown by massive national protests. The deaths of 28 protesters involved in a march against the Ciskei homeland almost brought the country to the precipice of all-out conflict. Despite Mandela having publicly broken off all relations with the De Klerk government, both sides made use of a back channel comprising key National Party and ANC negotiators who were able to get negotiations back on track. This led to the adoption of the Record of Understanding on 26 September 1992, which resolved most of the issues that had led to the breakdown of the talks. “It was an endless rollercoaster of crises, but after each crisis, we all had to get up, dust ourselves off, and get back to the negotiating table.”
Be Creative
During the negotiations and drafting of the new constitution, each delegation was allowed to have their own non-political experts on constitutional matters on their team. This led to a more practical and less ideological approach to solutions.
The ANC insisted that the new constitution could be drawn up only by a duly elected constitutional assembly. The minority parties feared that this might lead to the exclusion of their own basic concerns and demands. A creative approach was adopted in terms of which there would be two constitutions. The first was an interim constitution under which the country’s first democratic election would be held, and that would include 34 immutable principles with which the final constitution would have to comply. The newly elected parliament, sitting as a constitutional assembly, would draft the final constitution – but would have to do so within the framework of the 34 immutable principles – to the satisfaction of the newly established Constitutional Court.
Peace is Active, Not Passive
In the end, peace is not a passive state but an active pursuit, requiring the combined forces of imagination, resilience, and bold leadership. It thrives on the courage to bridge divides, the creativity to forge new paths where none seem to exist, and the unwavering commitment to justice and equity. While the road may be fraught with challenges, the actionable steps, as demonstrated by South Africa’s case study, are clear: build inclusive dialogues to promote mutual trust; work for a situation in which all parties accept that there will not be an armed solution – that there will have to be negotiations; Do not move too quickly – or too slowly in the pursuit of peace because all parties must be able to bring their constituencies with them; do not allow extremists to sabotage the peace process; accept that negotiations will require painful concessions from all sides to achieve win-win outcomes; be resilient – do not allow crises to divert you from the goal of achieving peaceful and just solutions. Though peace demands hard work, its rewards can be immeasurable and lasting — each small victory lays the foundation for a future where cooperation, and not conflict, is the norm.
